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STUDENT NOTES
HOT CGco CLAUSES AS A DEFENSE TO UNTION-INDUCED
SECoNDARY BoycoTrs

As a general policy it has always been the traditional practice
of American trade unions to render each other mutual aid and protection during strikes. 1 Of the arsenal of means available to implement this general policy, possibly the most effective weapon of
support has been the sympathy strike or secondary boycott based
upon a refusal to patronize or handle unfair goods.2
The classic unfair goods situation, resulting in a secondary
boycott, often arose in this manner:
The employees of plant X, having become embroiled in a
labor dispute with their employer, would strike the plant. Materials produced by plant X would subsequently be received
at plant Y, a customer of X. Under union inducement, the
1

Mis & MoNTGomERY, ORGANZED LABOR 20-21 (1945).
2 Id.at 581.
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employees at Y would refuse to handle the goods, and a sympathy strike or secondary boycott against the employer at plant
Y would be instituted.3
Even though the immediate dispute does not concern the
employees of plant Y, by making common cause with the employees
of plant X, not only is the power of each union enlarged, but the
pressure exerted on the employer at plant X to settle with his
employees is proportionally increased.
Under the original National Labor Relations Act, 4 this type of
union conduct was perfectly legitimate, but as early as 1942 Judge
Learned Hand questioned how far the community could safely
allow such power to grow.5 Judge Hand clearly recognized that
the public welfare was economically affected by labor-management
disputes, and that society might properly regulate the conflict in
order to insure a balance between the legitimate right of labor
to appeal for support and the interest. of society in limiting the
impact of industrial disputes. 6 In 1947, the enactment of the TaftHartley Act expressed society's conviction that some restrictions
7
must be placed on the secondary boycott activities of unions.
The restrictions currently applicable to union secondary boycott
activities can be found principally in section 8 (b) (4) (A) of
the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act. 8 In essence, this section makes it unlawful for a labor organization to induce or encourage employees to engage in a "strike"
or a "concerted refusal in the course of their employment" to handle
products, for the purpose of forcing one employer to stop doing
business with another employer.9 In short this section would prohibit a union having a labor dispute at plant X from inducing the
employees of plant Y to cease handling X's products so as to force
a cessation of business between X and Y.
At first glance then, it would seem that a union-inspired secondary boycott would constitute a violation per se of the act, leaving
the union open to an unfair labor charge filed by the injured
8 Address by General Counsel Jerome D. Fenton, briefing conference on
regulation of labor relations, Washington, D. C., April 10, 1958.
449 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 136 (1947).
5NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503
(2d Cir. 1942).
6Id.at 506.
7 1 LEGISLATIVE HSroRY OF =HETAFT-H mL AcT 414 (1948).
8 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 186, 141, 29

§158 (b) (4) (A) (1947).

U.S.C.

9 Fenton, supra note 3.
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secondary employer. Such a patent conclusion would obviously
obtain were it not for the hot cargo clauses which exist in many
collective bargaining agreements today.
As so aptly stated by the Board's general counsel, Jerome D.
Fenton, a hot cargo clause is nothing more than a "contractual formulization or formalization of a secondary boycott."10 The typical
hot cargo clause incorporated into a present day contract between
the employer and the union might read: "Employees may refuse
to handle material which the company purchases from any supplier whose employees are on strike because of a labor dispute."
In effect, the union employees at plant Y have agreed in advance
with their employer to refuse to handle merchandise or materials
from plant X, if and when the employees of plant X become embroiled in a dispute with their employer.
Assuming that a strike at plant X subsequently becomes a
reality, and plant rs employees are urged and induced by their
union to implement their hot cargo clause, a basic issue immediately
arises. Either the union's inducement of Y employees constitutes a
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the act, or the hot cargo clause
agreed to in advance by the employer at Y affords the union a
defense to a secondary boycott charge.
Before examining the decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts on this question, it would be well to review
the conflicting rationales presented by the proponents of these two
positions.
The argument that the union inducement is permissible and
nonviolative of section 8 (b) (4) (A) may be summarized in this
manner: section 8 (b) (4)(A) is silent on the question of union
inducement of employers as distinguished from inducement of
employees to boycott a product.'1 Therefore, may not a union
legally urge an employer to engage in a secondary boycott? What
an employer may lawfully do, he may agree to do in advance; hence,
the hot cargo clause is itself not unlawful under the act 12 If this
reasoning be accepted, then urging employees to abide by the clause
does not constitute inducement of a "strike" or a "concerted refusal
in the course of their employment," the only action explicitly cov10

Ibid.

Local 388, Printing Specialities Union (Sealright Pacific), 82 N.L.R.B.
2.71 11
(1949).
12
Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Conway's Express), 87
N.L.R.B.
972 (1949).
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ered by section 8 (b) (4) (A). 13 For, it is argued, the words
"strike" and "concerted refusal in the course of their employment"
presuppose that the employees are acting in defiance of or contrary
to their employer's wishes, but if the employer has consented, can
it be said that there is a "forcing or requiring" of an employer to
14
cease doing business with any other person?
On the other hand, those who oppose this line of reasoning base
their conclusion on a broader premise, namely, that the intent of
Congress in enacting section 8 (b) (4) (A) was not only to protect
the particular secondary employer involved, but also to shield the
general public who would be adversely affected by the boycott.' 5
If, so the argument goes, the legislative purpose is to protect the
public, then it follows that contractual waiver of the statutory
protection by the secondary employer immediately involved cannot
be determinative, for otherwise the public would be deprived of
its statutory safeguard without its consent.1 6 In essence then, this
line of reasoning concludes that any hot cargo clause must be sub17
ordinated to the legislative purpose of section 8 (b) (4) (A).
What effect then, if any, is to be given to a validly bargained
for hot cargo clause? This question has raised a broad divergence
of opinion not only within the National Labor Relations Board
itself, but also in the courts.
The Board originally took the position in the Conway's Express
case that a hot cargo clause afforded a union a complete defense
to a secondary boycott charge.' 8 Conway's Express presented a
situation in which companies X, Y, and Z entered into agreements
with the teamsters' union which reserved to the union the right to
refuse to handle goods or freight of any employer involved in a
labor dispute. The shop stewards at each of the three establishments induced the employees to cease handling Conway's freight
upon being advised by the union office that Conway's employees
were on strike. Each of the employers, apparently mindful of its
contractual obligations, acquiesced in its employees' refusal to
handle the hot cargo. Finding no violation of the act, a Board
13 Columbia Pictures Corp. and Ass'n of Motion Picture Producers, 82
N.L.R.B.
568 (1949).
14
Local 886, General Drivers Union (American Iron & Machine Works),
115 N.L.R.B.
800 (1956).
15
16 See, 93 CoNG. REc. 4823 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
See, 22 N.L.R.B. ANN.lin'. 148 (1957).
17 Conway's Express, supra note 12, at 989 (Member Reynolds dissenting).
18 Conways Express, supra note 12.
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majority ruled that there is nothing in the express provision or
underlying policy of section 8 (b) (4) (A) which prohibits an
employer and a union from voluntarily including a hot cargo provision in their collective bargaining agreement or from honoring
these provisions. 19
The Conway Express ruling was not a unanimous Board decision. A dissenting opinion by Member Reynolds illustrated the
differences of opinion within the Board as to the scope and purpose
of section 8 (b) (4) (A). The dissent pointed out that since the
act unequivocally forbids secondary boycott activity on the part
of unions,2 0 then to the extent that a contract provision authorizes
such activity, it is per se repugnant to the basic public policies of
the act.2 1
Nevertheless, the majority ruling in Conway's Express was later
adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2 2 and the
Second Circuit,2 3 thus apparently establishing hot cargo clauses
as a valid defense to a secondary boycott charge.
But labor law, as opposed to the more established fields of the
law, is a comparatively new creation, and must of necessity be more
flexible in order to meet constantly changing conditions in labormanagement relationships. 2 4 Certainly, as the complexion of the
Board itself changes, the labor philosophy of its members is bound
to be reflected in its rulings interpreting the act.
Possibly, changes in conditions and in Board membership may
explain the first major trend away from the philosophy of the Conway decision which occurred in McAllister Transfer.25 In a fact
situation strikingly similar to Conway, a majority of the Board found
that the union involved had violated section 8 (b) (4) (A). Two
Board members adopted the reasoning of Reynolds' dissent in Conway and found that the hot cargo clause was per se violative of the
act, while two of the remaining three members found, as in Conway,
that the hot cargo clause constituted a complete defense to a section
1

9See also Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Montgomery Ward & Co.)
87 N.L.R.B.
984 (1949).
2
o Conway's Express, supranote 12, at 988 (Member Reynolds dissenting).
21 United Bhd. of Carpenters (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N. L. R. B. 802
(1949).
22

Local 3838, Milk Drivers Union v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir.

1957).
2

3 Rabotin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
See NLBB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
25 Local 608, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (McAllister Transfer), 110 N.L.R.B.
24

1769 (1954).
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8 (b) (4) (A) charge. Board Chairman Farmer2 6 chose to concur with
the two members who found the hot cargo clause per se repugnant,
but he based his decision on an entirely different and novel view.
Apparently, the secondary employers in McAllister had posted
notices directing their employees to handle all freight without discrimination, and these statements were posted for the express purpose of putting employees on notice that they were expected to
handle McAllister freight. Chairman Farmer found that this action
by the employers constituted a repudiation of their hot cargo clauses,
and that the subsequent inducement of the employees by the union
to cease handling the disfavored goods was unprotected activity
and violative of section 8 (b) (4) (A).
Although Chairman Farmer's view never came to be adopted
by a Board majority, his opinion in McAllister may be said to have
constituted a basis for the reasoning used by the Board majority
six years later in the Sand Door2 7 case.

Sand Door found two members of the Board concluding that
the act does not invalidate the hot cargo agreement itself, but any
union inducement of employees to effectuate the agreement is
contrary to the congressional purpose in enacting section 8 (b)
(4) (A). 2 8 Unlike the rationale of Chairman Farmer in the Mc-

Allister case, as far as actual union inducement of employees is
concerned, the acquiescence or nonacquiescence of the employer to
a union implementation of an existing hot cargo clause becomes immaterial, since Sand Door would interpret the term "strike" and
"concerted refusal in the course of employment" used in section 8
(b) (4) (A) as covering any union-induced refusal to work.
In affirming Sand Door the Ninth Circuit adopted the Board's
majority view that such an agreement, even assuming that it is not
per se unlawful, still affords the union no defense to a secondary
boycott charge.2 9 The same opinion was expressed by the Sixth
Circuit in General Millwork.3 0
28
Former instructor
27

of law at West Virginia University.
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.),

118 N.L.R.B.
1210 (1955).
28

Member Rodgers concurring, but on the basis that hot cargo clauses are

per se illegal.

29NLRB v. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th
Cir. 1957).
30 NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.

1957).
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However, two other cases in which the Board applied the Sand
Door ruling were reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appealss and the Second Circuit.32 These two circuits reaffirmed the
Conway ruling, holding that there was no violation of section 8 (b) (4)
(A) unless the union involved encouraged the employees to coerce
the secondary employer, but there can be no coercion if the employees are merely encouraged to exercise a valid contractual right
to which the employer has agreed.
In order to resolve this conflict among the circuits, the Supreme
Court, during 1957, granted certiorari in several cases involving hot
cargo clauses.83 The single question tendered by the petition for
certiorari was whether a hot cargo clause constitutes a defense
under section 8 (b) (4) (A) to a union induced secondary boycott.
On June 16, 1958, the Court handed down its definitive ruling on
this question. 4 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court's majority, noted that section 8 (b) (4) (A) does not contain a blanket
outlawing of secondary boycotts as such, but rather describes and
condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objects.35 A
boycott voluntarily engaged in by a secondary employer for his own
business reasons is not forbidden. Likewise, a union is free to
approach an employer to persuade him to engage in a boycott as
long as the union refrains from the specifically prohibited means
of coercion through inducement of employees. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the congressional purpose in enacting section 8 (b)
(4) (A) was to extend to the primary employer or the general
public a complete protection against the adverse effects of a secondary boycott. But the Court went on to nullify the significance of
hot cargo clauses by finding that, even though the secondary employer may freely choose to enter into a boycott, it is likely that
Congress intended that the employer's freedom of choice contemplated by section 8 (b) (4) (A) is a freedom to choose whether
31
Local 886, General Drivers Union (American Iron & Machine Works
Co.),3 247
F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2
Local 338, Milk Drivers Union, 245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957).
33
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB; NLRB v. Local 886,
General Drivers Union; Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLBB, all 355
U.S. 808 (1957) (consolidated for hearing).
34 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 78 Sup. Ct. 1011

(1958).

35 Section 8 (b) (4) (A) provides that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted
refusal in the course of their employment... where an object thereof is the
forcing or requiring of any employer to cease doing business with any other pers0o3.1
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to boycott at the time the question arises. This freedom of choice
must, as a matter of federal policy, be available to the secondary
employer notwithstanding any private agreement between the
parties, since in this manner Congress may rightly be assumed to
have hoped that the scope of industrial conflict and the economic
effects of the primary dispute might be effectively limited.
In finding hot cargo clauses to be no defense to the inducement
of employees prohibited in section 8 (b) (4) (A), the Court never36
theless did not question the validity of a hot cargo clause as such.
This reasoning creates something of an anomaly which may well
lead to other labor litigation in no way related to secondary boycotts. For example, might a union now maintain an action for
breach of contract if the employer repudiates the hot cargo clause?
Would an employer be susceptible to a refusal to bargain charge
if he refuses to consider the inclusion of a hot cargo clause in his
collective bargaining agreement, and would the union then have
the right to strike because of this refusal to bargain?
These and other possible problems, not within the scope of
this note, would lead one to believe that the courts have not heard
the last of hot cargo clauses.
D. L. McC.

36 Note the analogy with the Court's position that restrictive covenants are
legal but unenforceable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss2/5

8

